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"There is a relationship, in the laws or philosophies of indigenous
peoples, between cultural property and intellectual property,
and [] the protection of both is essential to the indigenous peoples' cultural
and economic survival ... ." 1
Michael F. Brown's Who Owns Native Culture? 2 is a thoughtful exploration of
the issues raised by intellectual property law and indigenous cultures. The book
gives several detailed accounts of disputes, addressing such questions as
copyright in the art of the Ganalbingu people in the Northern Territory of
Australia and patent rights in pharmaceuticals derived from traditional
knowledge of healing plants. 3 It succeeds in drawing out many complexities
and showing numerous perspectives. This paper does not seek to review the
book, beyond commending it as an intelligent and nuanced addition to the
literature. Rather, this paper looks specifically to some general conclusions the
book draws about whether intellectual property law is a useful tool to protect
indigenous cultures. Brown suggests that "judicious modification of intellectual
property law" has a role to play. 4 But much of the book argues against reliance
on intellectual property, preferring negotiation on the basis of mutual dignity. 5
Intellectual property law, in this view, threatens the public domain and is illsuited in many respects for application to indigenous cultures. This paper
suggests a different way to frame the issue, in which intellectual property law,
negotiation, and human rights precepts work together to address indigenous
claims to heritage protection. 6
I. Special Interests, the Public Domain, and Indigenous Peoples
Brown raises concern for the "public domain, which is squeezed on one side by
the privatizing logic of the world's corporations and on the other by nativerights activists promoting novel forms of collective copyright." 7 He thus places
the calls for intellectual property protection of indigenous cultures within the
larger context of intellectual property law. Recent intellectual property law
public debate and scholarship has indeed recognized that the public domain is
threatened by the increasing reach of patent, copyright, trademark, trade
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secret, and related bodies of law. 8 Framed this way, calls for the use of
intellectual property law to protect native cultures would appear to lead to new
incursions on the threatened public domain. This has considerable resonance in
a time of increasing public awareness of the privatization of abstractions. 9
Brown is right in suggesting that any proposals to increase the reach of
intellectual property protection should consider the effect on freedom to
transmit ideas, to innovate, and to express oneself. Framing the overall issue
in this way, however, overlooks some key distinctions between special
interests, the public domain, and indigenous peoples' claims to heritage
protection.
First, it equates the ability special interests have had to shape intellectual
property law to the calls for protection of indigenous cultures, characterizing
the public domain as being squeezed between the two. But there are many
differences in both the political strength of the indigenous claims and the
position of indigenous peoples, vis-a-vis corporate power. Second, it is not so
much a question of the public domain versus corporate and indigenous
interests, as it is a question of the impact corporate interests have had on the
indigenous claims. Indeed indigenous peoples' claims are in many respects
more properly aligned with the interests of the public. Third, there are
important questions of discriminatory treatment of indigenous knowledge that
are overlooked when the issue is framed as such. The principle of nondiscrimination is an important human rights precept that is equally applicable
to the protection of indigenous intellectual and cultural property. Lastly, the
scope and source of the rights being advanced by indigenous peoples are quite
different than those of corporate or special interests. Legal protection of
indigenous heritages is sought not for pure economic gain, but rather because
it is integral to indigenous survival. And the source of this protection is
grounded not in the "privatizing logic" of commercial law, but rather in human
rights law.
The last few decades have indeed seen a steady increase in intellectual
property protection in every area. Patent subject matter has been extended to
every field of endeavor. Patents now issue on subject matter once thought
unpatentable: new life forms, business methods, and software, to name a few.
10
Copyright's reach has likewise broadened to cover things like software, and
to provide new rights, such as the infamous anti-circumvention rules in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 11 The copyright term has been extended
until, for practical purposes, it has become infinite. 12 Trademark law has
expanded from the protection of trade symbols to protection of every
imaginable symbol, including colors, scents and sounds. 13 The varieties of
trademark protections have increased from mere trademark infringement to
just theories of dilution, and anti-cyber-squatting protection. In addition,
trademark infringement itself has been richly expanded to include such
theories as post-sale confusion, initial interest confusion and reverse confusion.
In short, intellectual property law has greatly expanded, largely driven by the
special interests' role in legislation and in the formulation of international
treaties.
But indigenous people have hardly had the same sway as corporate interests.
Intellectual property law has been expanded for corporate interests in a
number of sweeping ways. By comparison, the few measures that have
recognized rights in indigenous cultures have been quite limited. In the United
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States, the most significant examples are the Indian Arts and Crafts Act 14 and
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). 15 None
of these has had an effect on the public domain that is significant compared to
the legislative grants to industry interests. In the international area, indigenous
interests have hardly received the sort of attention that corporate interests
have. The most significant change in international law is that intellectual
property, through the TRIPS agreement, has been made part of international
trade law. Thus, nations that do not abide by the international standards are
subject to the coercive processes of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
dispute resolution mechanism. Developed nations have put considerable
pressure on developing nations to gradually adopt such norms. 16 Efforts to use
international treaties to provide protection of indigenous cultures, by contrast,
have met much more resistance. 17 Thanks to the efforts of indigenous groups
and non-governmental organizations (NGO), both the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and the WTO have at least taken some issues
into consideration. 18 But, although issues of indigenous cultures now have a
seat at the table, they have as yet little concrete recognition.
There is a second problem in viewing the public domain as being attacked on
one front by corporations and on another front by indigenous peoples. The
expansion of intellectual property law has not come only at the expense of the
general public domain. To the contrary, it has cut into specific interests, such
as those of indigenous peoples. Thus, in many respects, the rights of
indigenous peoples are more properly aligned with the public domain than
opposed. In intellectual property, as in other areas, legal protection for native
peoples is effectively eroding, rather than expanding.
The political forces that allowed commercial power to decrease the public
domain are also allowing commercial interests to increase at the cost of
indigenous peoples. Many of the claims sought by indigenous peoples are not
claims to something in the public domain, but rather claims for protection from
corporate intellectual property. Folklore or indigenous music, for example, are
often not protected by copyright. 19 But a modern recording containing
indigenous music or a new book containing folklore may be copyrighted, if it
contains even minimal new elements (the choices made in the sound recording
or the editorial additions to the folklore). 20 So a commercial interest may, in
effect, be able to hold copyrights in the products of an indigenous group.
Similarly, in biotechnology, traditional knowledge about the properties of plants
may be privatized. Patent law "enables broad patents on minor modifications,
syntheses, and purifications," such as "plant genetic resources, where patents
based on local knowledge of plant qualities have become routine." 21
Other areas of intellectual property likewise show indigenous groups seeking
not to diminish the public domain but to resist privatization. The best known
indigenous people's trademark case may be that concerning the trademarked
phrase, "The Washington Redskins." 22 U.S. trademark law bars protection for
trademarks that are disparaging of a group of people, just as it bars protection
for various other disfavored categories of mark. 23 The dispute did not involve
Native Americans attempting to remove something from the public domain, but
rather to prevent a commercial entity from owning rights to a term that
disparaged them.
Patent prosecution is another good example of commercial interests being
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favored at the expense of indigenous peoples. Perhaps the greatest problem in
patent law for indigenous peoples is not the law itself but rather its
administration. Many issued patents have not met the substantive or
procedural requirements for patent protection. When patents are litigated,
somewhere around forty percent of them are held invalid by federal district
courts. 24 The dynamics of the patent prosecution process tend to contribute to
this. A patent examiner has limited time to examine the patent claims and the
rest of the patent application to look at all the relevant prior art and to
determine whether or not the applicant deserves a patent. It is very difficult for
the patent office to make such a determination, which in theory would include
researching the history of the relevant invention and looking at every
document ever published that was relevant to the work. The path of least
resistance is certainly to allow the patent to issue. Given how expensive it
actually would be to conduct thorough patent examinations, 25 the burden of
challenging invalid patents lies with those who would challenge them - a
multimillion-dollar task which may not be feasible for an indigenous group. In
the areas of biotechnology and of traditional knowledge, it is therefore possible
for companies to effectively patent knowledge. Patent quality becomes a huge
concern for indigenous peoples. Here again the model of the public domain
being squeezed between corporate interests and indigenous claims is
inaccurate. Rather the problem lies in corporations removing information from
the public domain to the detriment of indigenous groups. Reforms that improve
the quality of patent examination would thus benefit the public domain and
also indigenous peoples, not one at the expense of the other.
Another problem with characterizing the conflict as one between indigenous
claims and corporate interests squeezing the public domain is that much of the
criticisms by indigenous groups seek merely to obtain equal treatment under
the intellectual property laws - not equal treatment in the sense of matching
the special-interest legislation, but simply in applying the basic rules of
intellectual property law. Non-discrimination in the enjoyment of fundamental
rights and the protection of law are basic tenets of human rights law. 26 Yet
indigenous groups face significant discrimination, particularly in the area of
protection of property under the law. 27 Intellectual property law is no
exception.
Patent law, for example, has been amended to reduce discrimination against
foreign inventors, but not to equalize its treatment of traditional knowledge.
U.S. patent laws used to unfairly discriminate against foreign inventors. In a
priority dispute between a U.S. inventor and foreign inventor, the foreign
inventor could not rely upon activity in her own jurisdiction to support her
claims of inventorship. So, the foreign inventor was forced to rely on the
priority date established by her U.S. filing date, as opposed to a U.S. inventor
who could rely on a priority date established by the inventive activity. This
distinction was dropped as the U.S. sought to conform to the treaties it had
signed.
Compare this to the treatment of indigenous peoples abroad. Under U.S. law, if
an invention has been described in writing anywhere in the world, it is no
longer patentable by others. What constitutes publication has been very widely
construed. For example, if a chemical was described in a doctoral thesis and
the doctoral thesis was put on a shelf in a library somewhere in Germany and
entered into the library index, that would be sufficient to keep that chemical in
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the public domain. 28 The result would be different, however, if the chemical
had been in use by indigenous peoples in a foreign country. 29 If the chemical
was known and used by an indigenous group in South America for instance,
it would still be patentable in the United States, no matter how widespread, or
how long standing that use was. 30 U.S. patent law thus privileges written
documentation over social use. An amendment to equalize this discrimination
would again strengthen, not diminish, the public domain.
Intellectual property law with respect to confidential information also gives
preferential treatment to commercial interests, by giving far greater legal
protection to trade secrets than to traditional knowledge. In one instance in the
U.S., a governmental agency sought to reach an agreement with a native
group concerning, among other things, traditional knowledge. 31 The parties
agreed that any traditional knowledge that was disclosed to the government
would be held in confidence. Subsequent examination of the agreement by
government lawyers, however, raised a number of issues including those
relating to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 32 Even if the government
agreed to keep the information confidential, it might be subject to mandatory
disclosure under FOIA requests. 33 A far different result would likely arise for
the confidential, valuable information of a corporation. If the information
qualified as a trade secret, then it would likely qualify for protection against
disclosure in FOIA requests. 34
Moreover, if regulatory action requires disclosure of a trade secret, that may
give the business a right to compensation, because mandatory disclosure of a
trade secret can amount to a taking of property for public use (like
condemnation of a home to build a freeway). 35 So providing traditional
knowledge legal protection (like trade secret knowledge) would do several
things. It would somewhat even the field with commercial knowledge and it
might facilitate sharing of the knowledge, because that could be done subject
to greater protection.
The greatest objection to equating indigenous claims with commercial claims is
that they derive from wholly different sources. Moreover, the stakes are quite
different. 36 Commercial claims to intellectual property, by and large, seek to
serve financial interests. The economic considerations that are served are often
those best able to make their way through the legislative and other policy
making processes. However, the source of indigenous claims is quite different.
Legal protection for certain aspects of native cultures is grounded in
principles of self-determination and international law. 37 Indeed, indigenous
groups seek intellectual property protection in order to promote their own
cultural survival, and as a by-product of their own claims to self-determination.
In a United Nations report on the "Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous
People," special rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes emphasizes this important link
between protection of indigenous heritages and the right of indigenous peoples
to exist as "distinct peoples" in control of their own destinies:

The protection of cultural and intellectual property is connected fundamentally
with the realization of the territorial rights and self-determination of indigenous
peoples. Traditional knowledge of values, autonomy, or self-government, social
organization, managing ecosystems, maintaining harmony among peoples and
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respecting the land is embedded in the arts, songs, poetry and literature which
must be learned and renewed by each succeeding generation of indigenous
children. 38
Thus, indigenous claims have a much sounder basis in many respects, even
though to date their political success has been less in the world's rule-making
bodies. 39 Finally, some indigenous claims to intellectual property protection
can be viewed as a very partial form of reparations for past wrongs. 40 At the
very least, governments have begun to recognize "the requirement of
affirmative action to secure indigenous cultural survival," 41 which may well
include changes to intellectual property law. Thus, even to the extent that
indigenous claims might diminish the public domain, they can, among other
reasons, be justified because they serve to build and preserve that very public
domain.
A related concern is the source of the public domain. One strong justification
for limiting intellectual property protection is that authors and inventors
necessarily rely on the public domain. Any novelist or software developer uses
concepts, tools, ideas, and expressive elements created by others. Because all
authors and inventors take from the public domain, they have less room for
complaint when elements of their respective contributions are made available
for copying by others. This argument has less force with respect to traditional
knowledge and folklore, where elements have often been developed without
borrowing from the public domain of other societies. For the same reason, the
risk of overprotection of intellectual property is different with respect to
indigenous peoples. All authors and inventors build on the public domain.
Intellectual property protection thus should balance the incentives given to
authors and inventors against the costs of that very protection to authors and
inventors. But where indigenous culture has not drawn in the same way on
that common domain, the balance is different. Indeed, because intellectual
property rights can be seen as a very partial form of reparations, it is hard to
imagine that there would ever be excessive compensation.
In addition, as Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder incisively show, the
public domain may benefit some more than others. 42 In theory, the public
domain is a rich resource of ideas available to all. Indeed, a vibrant public
domain is essential to creativity in every field. But expansion of the public
domain may mean different things, especially in the case of indigenous
peoples. In particular, "differing circumstances - including knowledge, wealth,
power, and ability - render some better able than others to exploit a
commons." 43 Thus, if such elements as traditional knowledge and folklore are
completely within the public domain, the commercial interests able to exploit
them most efficiently could benefit most. As Chander and Sunder show, the
present balance of intellectual property law gives protection to the knowledge
generated by developed countries, while tending to leave open to all the
knowledge generated by developing countries and indigenous peoples. Such a
balance should be changed, even if it alters the contours of the public domain.

44

II. The Role of Intellectual Property Law
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Who Owns Native Culture? focuses on refuting what it terms claims for "Total
Heritage Protection," characterizing that as the attempt to place entire
indigenous cultures "off-limits to scrutiny and exploitation." 45 A lesson of
twentieth-century history "is that there is reason to be wary of totalizing
solutions to complex social problems." 46 The century was "littered with the
ruins of failed utopias that caused untold human misery." 47
This focus may well miss the mark in terms of the linkages between human
rights and the protection of indigenous intellectual and cultural property. For
instance, the book describes the U.N. report on "The Protection of the Heritage
of Indigenous People" as "a canonical text that makes the case for Total
Heritage Protection." 48 However, viewed through a different lens, this and
other related reports place indigenous claims in context. 49 As one noted
scholar has stated:

Specific historical experiences and current political struggles provide the
relevant context for considering [indigenous] claims of cultural appropriation.
Only by situating these claims in this context can we understand how
supposedly abstract, general, and (purportedly) universal principles ... may
operate as systematic structures of domination and exclusion. An evaluation
and judgment of Native claims of cultural appropriation without this knowledge
of context cannot but reinforce these larger patterns of injustice. 50
The historical and ongoing practices of governments and other entities to
dispossess Native peoples of their tangible and intangible property and
assimilate them into the dominate society are well documented. 51 Equally
relevant to any analysis of indigenous claims to cultural heritage protection is
an understanding of how Native cultures are inextricably connected to their
identity as a people. 52 Thus, as the Daes report concludes, international and
domestic measures may well be necessary in order for "indigenous peoples to
retain control over their remaining cultural and intellectual, as well as natural
wealth, so that they have the possibility of survival and self-development." 53
Moreover, the likelihood of total legal protection of indigenous cultures is
remote. There is little chance that that such broad-ranging cultural protection
would become standard. 54 As noted above, legal protections for indigenous
cultures are few and far between. Attempts to pass the far greater protections
implied by "Total Heritage Protection" would, in many areas, meet the same
powerful political forces that have had considerable success in shaping
intellectual property law to serve industry interests. International trade
negotiations are instructive. Developing nations have been hard-pressed,
seeking concessions in some areas (such as merely opening their markets to
free competition in agricultural products) in exchange for agreeing to move
toward similar intellectual property law regimes. Indigenous groups, which
may not have the growing markets to offer, are hardly likely to receive the
vastly greater agreements that such "Total Heritage Protection" might entail.
Supposed claims for Total Heritage Protection are hardly a threat to the public
domain. It is about as likely that there would be total land reparations, with
settler societies like the U.S. handing back their entire territory to the
aboriginal inhabitants.
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Rather, the question is whether intellectual property protection for indigenous
culture will be fashioned at all. Brown, like others, questions whether
intellectual property law is suitable for use as a tool to protect indigenous
cultures. He raises several features of intellectual property law that might
make it ill-suited for such application. Intellectual property law, especially in
the United States, serves financial interests, as opposed to protecting cultural
interests. 55 Moral rights have consistently been paid much less attention than
financial interests in intellectual property law. 56 In addition, he contrasts the
individualistic approach of intellectual property law (granting rights to
individual authors and inventors), to the sort of collective rights that might
best be used in such areas as folklore and traditional knowledge. The book also
characterizes advocates as seeking novel and untested forms of intellectual
property. This section suggests that such obstacles are not as great as they
might at first appear. Intellectual property law has been readily adapted to
new subject matter and to various types of group production and ownership.
Much has been made of the apparently individualistic bent of intellectual
property law. Group rights, by contrast, have been deemed alien to the basic
framework of such laws. Such arguments have been raised in opposition to the
United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which
provides: "Indigenous Peoples have the right to own and control their
intellectual and cultural property including indigenous sciences, technologies,
genetic, seeds, medicines, flora and fauna, languages, literature, designs and
visual and performing arts." 57 If groups were granted rights in folklore or
traditional knowledge or other cultural elements, the argument runs, there
could be intractable problems, such as determining the appropriate group,
arbitrating differences in opinion about exercising the rights, and providing a
means for other to deal with the group to seek permission to use the cultural
elements.
But intellectual property law has long dealt with the very same issues. There
are many areas in which intellectual property rights are both created and held
by groups. A movie, for example, may be the product of creative contributions
from dozens or hundreds of directors, writers, actors, costumers, special
effects technicians, and more. Inventions from pharmaceuticals to software to
aeronautics all require input from many people over a long period of time.
Trademarks often act as a banner giving an illusion of unity to vast
international enterprises. The rights to copyrights and patents are often held
by corporations with millions of shareholders.
A recent change to U.S. patent law shows how the individualist cast does not
fit even modern industrial society. An inventor is entitled to a patent only if her
product or process is significantly different from what others have already
done, as opposed to an obvious step. But that rule can be difficult to apply to
the product of teamwork. Any individual's contribution might not qualify as a
sufficient advance, if the other teammembers' work counted as preexisting
work. The U.S. patent law was amended to treat teams, in effect, as a single
inventor for determining whether a claimed invention was sufficiently
"nonobvious." 58 Thus, individual inventorship is hardly an unchangeable
bedrock of intellectual property law. Rather, intellectual property law has
adapted - especially where the affected interests were able to get legislation.
Trademark law also serves groups. A trademark can be a unifying symbol for a
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vast enterprise - think only of Coca-Cola, McDonalds, or the United States
Postal Service. Particular types of trademarks can further specifically serve to
promote the interests of groups. A union can use a "collective mark." 59 A
certification mark can be used to demonstrate that a product or service
conforms to the standards shared by a group. Thus, the OSI Certified mark can
be used on software to show that it conforms to the principles of the open
source software movement - a large, dispersed group united mainly by
certain beliefs about computer programs. 60 Accordingly, trademark can also fit
into protecting group rights with respect to indigenous peoples. Indeed, as
evidenced by the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, 61 and by numerous marks
registered to indigenous groups, such use of trademark is growing - and
affecting the nature of trademark law itself. 62 Intellectual property increasingly
must face issues of creation by groups, 63 and in some respects indigenous
peoples are leading in this adaptation.
Even though intellectual property rights are often group rights (and the groups
can number in the millions), this has not proven a great obstacle to
apportioning those rights. There are naturally disputes over ownership and
inventorship, but such disputes are the exception. A new pharmaceutical rarely
has scientists within a drug company fighting over the patent rights, and a new
film does not usually have a dispute over the copyright. Rather, the ownership
rules of intellectual property law, along with contracts, corporate law and other
mechanisms, settle the ownership as agreed by the parties or as set out by the
law. There is no reason to think that similar results would not obtain for
indigenous groups, through their own mechanisms for governance and dispute
resolution. 64 In one instance in the United States, a group of indigenous
nations from the same region worked together to form a consortium
designed to address any disputes arising out of the issue of "cultural affiliation"
and the return of human remains under NAGPRA. Other indigenous groups in
the U.S. and elsewhere have adopted laws and related mechanisms that
specifically address cultural resource protection. 65 Indigenous groups,
especially as part of economic development effort, have considerable
experience in integrating commercial law into their own governance systems. 66
With respect to moral rights, Brown quite correctly states that intellectual
property law in the U.S. has not contained many explicit protections for moral
rights, as such. Nevertheless, moral rights have found protection through the
broad types of rights available. Moral rights include such things as rights of
attribution, rights of integrity (protecting against destruction or distortion of
the work), and rights of disclosure (the right to decide whether and when a
work will be published). 67 Some would also include rights such as the right of
withdrawal (to take a work such as a book off the market), the right to reply to
criticism, and "following rights" (for example, the right of a painter to receive a
percentage of the proceeds if her work is sold, even long after she has sold the
work). 68
Such rights are not explicitly protected by U.S. intellectual property law, but,
as commonly noted, can nevertheless be found by applying more general
rights. If a work is distorted, for example, that would likely infringe copyright
by creating a "derivative work." 69 Likewise, distortion of the work could violate
the license under which the work was used, giving rise to a claim under
contract law. 70 If authorship is misattributed, that could violate trademark law,
as trademark infringement, false designation of origin, or simply false
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advertising. 71 If a work is published without consent of the author, that could
be copyright infringement - and the Supreme Court has given considerable
weight to the author's right of first publication. 72 Likewise, the right of
withdrawal can find some protection in the author's exclusive right to make
and distribute copies. 73 Such rights of attribution, integrity, and disclosure
could broadly serve the interests of indigenous peoples in controlling whether
and how cultural elements were disseminated.
To take a very specific example from copyright law, the right of termination
might find resonance within a copyright scheme for indigenous works. Under
U.S. copyright law, a grant of rights under a copyright may be terminated after
thirty-five years. 74 If an author sells her copyright to a publisher, she has the
right to terminate that transfer after thirty-five years. Termination gives her
back the rights under the copyright. Rights of termination are inalienable,
meaning they withstand even the broadest attempts to make copyright
licenses irrevocable. The theory behind termination rights is that authors may
be commercially unsophisticated, lack bargaining power, and have certain
moral rights in their creations. Thus, despite copyright law's largely commercial
role in the U.S., it does go beyond providing a framework for commercial
transactions, and shows a willingness to undo deals in the interest of moral
rights, a framework that would fit well with using intellectual property to serve
indigenous self-determination. Where indigenous groups could show similar
factors affecting them, a similar right would be appropriate.
The subject matter relevant to indigenous cultures, such as folklore and
traditional knowledge, is also often deemed beyond the scope of intellectual
property law. But the subject matter of intellectual property has never been
fixed. To the contrary, it has adapted readily to new social practices and
technology. As noted above, patent subject matter has spread from mechanical
devices to every type of inventive activity, from biotechnology to ways of
selling advertising space on web pages. Trademark law has gone from
protecting a few types of designations to covering any type of symbol, whether
visual, aural or otherwise. 75 The first U.S. copyright statute covered a narrow
range of published material: maps, charts, and books. Copyright now applies
to the entire spectrum of creative works, from architecture to zodiacs. 76 It
could likewise adapt to the protection of folklore or indigenous art.
Brown does not categorically reject the use of intellectual property law to
protect native cultures, despite the many cautions he raises. To the contrary,
he suggests that some judicious modifications of intellectual property law
would have a role to play. Rather, his skepticism is directed toward the sort of
exclusive rights that typically come into play with intellectual property. The
most extended specific proposal he makes is the use of compulsory licensing in
the area of traditional knowledge that may be used to develop such
commercial products as pharmaceuticals. 77 Compulsory licensing, the
requirement that commercial interests pay fees in order to make use of the
knowledge, would permit payment to indigenous groups while at the same
time permitting the general benefits of commercialization. Brown's proposal is
quite consistent with his general view that intellectual property law generally is
best suited to financial concerns, as opposed to cultural issues, and consistent
with his skepticism of "rights talk" and propertization of culture. But indigenous
groups seek much more than money. Rather, exclusive rights may be more
appropriate in some areas, where the associated control would be consistent
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with the group's claims to self-determination - even where economic efficiency
may not be best served. Compulsory licensing removes control over traditional
knowledge and cultural elements, leaving only the price to be determined. But
other approaches could recognize the interest indigenous peoples have in
control, while balancing other interests. For example, one commentator
suggests "localized institutions that are a mixture of public and private that are
a "commons' on the inside, and "private property' on the outside. These types
of evolving and flexible institutions importantly shift the focus from ownership
of resources to governance." 78
In the end, Brown's focus on "Total Heritage Protection" draws attention away
from the many attempts to devise balanced ways to use intellectual property
law to protect native cultures while accommodating other interests. A number
of commentators have sought to come up with ways to balance various
competing interests. 79 What these and other proposals suggest is both possible
and desirable to provide intellectual property protection for indigenous
cultures. Exactly what those protections might entail must be answered in
consultation with indigenous peoples themselves and in accordance with their
customs and beliefs, if they are to be effective.
III. Negotiation and Cultural Protection
Who Owns Native Culture? calls for reliance on negotiation and mutual respect,
as an alternative to "rights" incorporated into law. 80 But, negotiation and legal
standards are interdependent in the context of indigenous peoples' rights
and have long had an important interplay for several reasons. First, in
negotiating for protection of indigenous cultures, indigenous peoples have
always had much more success when they've had some legal power behind
them. For instance, in the context of NAGPRA, while it may be true, as Brown
notes, that museums are more willing today to enter into "extended
negotiations" with Native nations, prior to the passage of NAGPRA, museums
were rarely, if ever, knocking on the doors of Indian country or opening their
own archival doors to discuss the issue of repatriation with Native peoples.
"Professionalism" and "simple decency" (which Brown asserts are the primary
factors pushing archives to the negotiating table) 81 are honorable traits, but
law has gone a long way in helping museums realize the value of those traits.
82
As Kristen Carpenter notes with respect to legal protection of sacred sites,
"[a] stronger articulation of [legal] rights may help to ensure that the parties
even engage in dialogue and work toward accommodation." 83 However, as
Carpenter further notes, this does not foreclose "negotiated approaches" to
cultural protection nor does it ignore the larger context in which these
decisions are being made: "The recognition of rights in a vulnerable minority
does not require reverting to the winner-take-all property law approach ... .
Rights have a place in negotiated approaches to legal problems." 84 Second, in
some matters, negotiation, unless it is to be endlessly repeated, can be best
fulfilled when the results of negotiation are made into law. Similarly, it helps to
ensure that the historical and contemporary injustices that led to the
negotiations in the first place will not be repeated. NAGPRA once again
provides a nice example. According to Suzan Shown Harjo, one of the principle
negotiators of NAGPRA, the law was "intended to provide some small
measure of justice for native Peoples in the modern era for the generational
suffering and hardship imposed by [past] policies and practices that outlawed
Native religions and violated fundamental rules of human decency." 85 The book
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is also somewhat inconsistent when it criticizes these statutes. For example it
points out that the Indian Arts and Crafts Act 86 does not give protection to all
indigenous peoples. Rather, its protection is limited to artisans of recognized
tribes - a valid criticism noted by many. 87 But negotiations are likely to reach
results that are partial. So it is perhaps unfair to call for negotiations on one
hand and then to summarily criticize the results of those very negotiations. The
solution to the inadequacies inherent in negotiated laws, like the Indian Arts
and Crafts Act, is not less law, but rather modification of those laws as may be
warranted. Finally, legal protection serves negotiation by helping to put the
parties on an even footing. Negotiation where one party lacks any leverage is
likely not to succeed. One example outside the intellectual property context is
the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement with the Inuit people and the
Canadian Government. 88 The Premier of Nunavut has stated that prior to the
passage of the 1982 Canadian Constitutional Act, 89 which constitutionalized
indigenous rights, there was "little incentive to negotiate and sign a land claim
when a subsequent government had the power to overturn that agreement if it
so chose." 90
Similarly, international negotiations will continue to shape intellectual
property law. The results of those negotiations will be influenced by preexisting
attitudes toward the relationship between intellectual property law and
traditional knowledge:

The choice of forum, the mindsets of the negotiators, the extent and impact of
cognitive barriers on the policymakers, and the participation of the indigenous
community in the negotiation process will play major roles in determining
whether governments can create a mutually beneficial solution, whether they
can promote biological and cultural diversity, and whether they can establish a
harmonized regime that effectively protects folklore, traditional knowledge,
and indigenous practices. 91
The international negotiations also shape the climate in which local
negotiations are conducted. 92
If concern for indigenous peoples can become a real element in formulating
international intellectual property law, the benefits could go beyond protection
of indigenous cultures. As noted above, such negotiations have recently tended
to benefit corporate interests at the cost of the public domain. They also have
tended to increase the emphasis on the financial aspects of intellectual
property, at the cost of its role in protecting moral rights. But intellectual
property is not merely an aspect of trade protection, notwithstanding its recent
move to the World Trade Organization. Rather, it can play an important role in
protecting human rights
FOOTNOTES:
n1. Resolution of Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/30, 1992/35 (Aug. 27, 1992).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n2. Michael F. Brown, Who Owns Native Culture? (2003). A website at
http://www.williams.edu/go/native supplements the book, providing access to
a number of related research resources.

n3. Id. at 44-48, 106-08.

n4. Id. at 10.

n5. Id.

n6. On use of the term "indigenous heritage," see Tony Simpson, The Forest
Peoples Programme, Indigenous Heritage and Self-Determination 20 (1997);
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, Erica-Irene Daes, U.N.
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Doc. E.97.XIV.3, PP 21-32 (1997) [hereinafter Protection of the Heritage of
Indigenous People].

n7. Brown, supra note 2, at 7.

n8. See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens (1996);
Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2001); Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright
(2001).

n9. "With the intellectual community in substantial agreement that the world
has too much intellectual property, those adopting the strategy of proprietizing
existing knowledge and unimproved plant genetic resources are in a difficult
political position." Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 519, 523 (2003).

n10. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that a
life form could be patented, and that patent law extended to "include anything
under the sun that is made by man"); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc.,
172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding specifically that
business methods were patentable, and generally that there were few limits on

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

the subject matter of patents, as long as the invention met the requirements of
novelty, nonobviousness, and written description); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming breadth of patent subject matter).

n11. See 17 U.S.C. 1201-05 (2000) (containing anti-circumvention
provisions, which were added to the Copyright Act in 1998 and give
considerable new protections to copyright holders).

n12. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003) (affirming the
extension of copyright term to ninety-five years, thus leaving items published
since 1923 under copyright); Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred's Aftermath, 10 Mich.
Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 95 (2003). On the expansion of copyright, see
William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers
Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 661
(1996); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 1149, 1154 (1998) (on the "seemingly inexorable expansion of
copyright"); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 Wired, Jan. 1996, at
134. On the difficulties of reconciling expanding copyright with freedom of
speech, see, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law:
What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign
Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1
(2000); for a broad view, see Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 715 (2003).

n13. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999); Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional
Expansion of American Trademark Law, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 827 (2000).

n14. 25 U.S.C. 305 (2000).

n15. Id. 3001-13. See generally Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human
Rights, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 49 (2002).

n16. See generally Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and
Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual
Property Protection, 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 11 (1998).

n17. See, e.g., International Indian Treaty Council, Summary of the Informal
Intersessional Consultations 16-19 (2002), at

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

www.treatycouncil.org/new_page_552.htm (articulating various objections by
some states to Article 29 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which provides for recognition and control over indigenous peoples'
intellectual and cultural property).

n18. For example, An Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore has been
established in connection with WIPO. See http://www.wipo.int/.

n19. See Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property
Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal
Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 769, 819-22 (1999);
Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 175, 177
(2000).

n20. Riley, supra note 19, at 175-78 (discussing the "exploitation of a sacred
tribal creation which has its roots in thousands of years of Ami tradition" by a
German rock group Enigma, which had digitally incorporated the Ami Song of
Joy into "a popular "world beat' tune known as Return of Innocence").

n21. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and
Community Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev.
275, 281 (2001). See generally Russel L. Barsh, First Peoples Worldwide, The
North American Pharmaceutical Industry and Research Involving Indigenous
Knowledge (2001).

n22. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see
also Gavin Clarkson, Racial Imagery and Native Americans: A First Look at the
Empirical Evidence Behind the Indian Mascot Controversy, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 393, 394 (2003).

n23. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) (2000).

n24. See Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1495 (2001).

n25. See id. at 1497.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n26. See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 129-31
(2004). Nondiscrimination as a basic tenet of international human rights law is
articulated in a number of human rights instruments such as the United
Nations Charter (I.C. art. 1(3)), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(I.C. arts. 1 & 2), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (I.C.
arts. 2(2) & 26), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (art. 2) to name a few.

n27. See Erica-Irene Daes, Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to
Land, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
53rd Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (2001);
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Study on the Protection of the
Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/28 (1993); S. James Anaya and Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural Resources
Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 33
(2001).

n28. An American who coincidently discovered the same chemical in the
United States would not be entitled to a patent on it, even though it would be
highly unlikely that the American would have the ability to search out that
obscure dissertation in a foreign jurisdiction, evidenced only by an entry in an
index. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

n29. Coombe, supra note 21, at 281 ("There is no doubt that the
appropriation of traditional knowledge continues and the existing U.S. patent
system permits and encourages such appropriation to the extent that it fails to
recognize foreign prior art unless it is published.").

n30. The public use bar to a patent applies only to activity within in the
United States. See 35 U.S.C. 102 (2000).

n31. David Ruppert, Buying Secrets, in Intellectual Property Rights for
Indigenous Peoples 113 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994).

n32. Id. at 121 n.12.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n33. .See, e.g., Bureau of Land Mgmt., General Procedural Guidance for
Native American Consultation, Rep. No. H-8160-1, Ch. III, Sec. F, ("BLM
Handbook"), available at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/handbook/h81601.html. "One of the greatest barriers to completely open consultation
discussions is Native Americans' hesitation to divulge information about places
that are considered to have a sacred character, or practices that are of a
sacred or private nature... . We must not overstate our ability to protect
sensitive information." Id. There are limited exemptions, but they fail to
provide adequate protection compared to that provided to commercial
interests. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470w-3(a)
(2000) (may be able to withhold information about the "location, character, or
ownership of a historic resource" that is eligible for the National Register if
disclosure would "impede the use of a traditional religious site by
practitioners"); Archaeological Resource Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 470hh
(2000), and accompanying regulations, 43 C.F.R. 7 (2005) (permitting "federal
agencies to protect archaeological resources from harm by restricting
information on their nature and location"). Compare Freedom of Information
Act, Exemption 4, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) (2000) (protecting trade secrets and
confidential commercial information), with Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath
Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (finding documents
concerning communications between the Department of the Interior's Bureau
of Reclamation and the Klamath Tribe relating to water rights not exempted
from disclosure under Exemption 5 as "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters"); Shannon Taylor Waldron, Trust in the Balance: The
Interplay of FOIA's Exemption 5, Agency-Tribal Consultative Mandates, and the
Trust Responsibility, 26 Vt. L. Rev. 149 (2001) (criticizing the Court's decision
as being volatize of, among other things, the federal-tribal trust relationship).

n34. See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) (exempting from disclosure "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential").

n35. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 680 (1st Cir.
1998).

n36. Shuba Ghosh, Reflections on the Traditional Knowledge Debate, 11
Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 497, 497 (2003).

Even though these tensions are played out in the arena of intellectual property,
it is important to recognize the difference between the traditional knowledge
debate and other debates over the expansion of intellectual property in other
areas, such as with academic culture or with the Internet. The traditional
knowledge debate occurs in the context of a culture clash between the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

developing and developed worlds, between different social structures in the
South and in the North (as well as structures within those two regions). The
questions of whether an artifact of traditional knowledge should be owned and
of who the owner should be determine issues of development, sovereignty, and
control over resources.
Id. at 497 (citations omitted).

n37. Self-determination is an evolving legal precept that at minimum
guarantees "all peoples" the right to "freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), art.
1 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See generally Anaya, supra note 26, at 97-128; Antonio
Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995). While the
scope of that right has been the subject of much debate, international law, as
it stands today, seems squarely on the side of the protection and enhancement
of indigenous cultural identities. Id. at 131-41; see also Lorie M. Graham,
Resolving Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 10 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L.
385 (2004); Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After
Kosovo: Translating Self-Determination "Into Practice" and "Into Peace," 6
ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 455 (2000). Support for this position can be found in
numerous international treaties and declarations. See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 27
(affirming the rights of persons belonging to "ethnic, religious, or linguistic
minorities" to "enjoy their own culture" in "community with other members of
their group"); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, UNCED, art.
8(j), 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div./N7INCE.5/4 (1992) (obligating contracting
parties to "respect, preserve, and maintain knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities"). Other scholars have made
similar claims relying on domestic law and policy. See, e.g., Riley, supra note
19, at 205.

n38. Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6, P 4.

n39. However, some international bodies have begun to take note of
indigenous peoples' concerns as they relate to intellectual property. See, e.g.,
Report on the Roundtable on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge
(Geneva, Nov. 1-2, 1999), WIPO/IPTK/RT/ 99/7 (May 4, 2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/folklore/ tkrt99_7.htm;
Report on the Third Session, WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and
Folklore (Geneva, June 13-21, 2002); WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/17 (June 21, 2002),
available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/
en/meetings/2002/igc/wipo_grtkfic_3_17.htm. Moreover, as Professor Anaya
so aptly demonstrates in his book, Indigenous People in International Law,
"international law, although once an instrument of colonialism, has developed
and continues to develop, however grudgingly or imperfectly, to support
indigenous peoples' demands." Anaya, supra note 26, at 4.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n40. Widespread and systematic denial of indigenous peoples' rights to their
tangible and intangible property has resulted in a denial of their fundamental
right to exist as distinct peoples. See, e.g., Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the
Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, 45th
Sess., Agenda Item 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (July 1993);
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6. Such violations
may well give rise to claims of reparations under international law. See
generally Theo van Boven, Final Report, Study Concerning the Right to
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Escor, 45th Sess., Agenda
Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993 (July 1993); Theo van Boven, Revised
Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparations for Victims of
Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, U.N. Escor, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 (1996); cf. Lorie M.
Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 Legal Stud. F. 619,
622-23 (2001) (discussing how particular statutes may constitute a form of
partial reparations).

n41. Anaya, supra note 26, at 103. "Comments by governments ... and other
international bodies, as well as trends in government initiatives domestically,
indicate broad acceptance of the requirement of affirmative action to secure
indigenous cultural survival." Id.

n42. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public
Domain, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1331 (2004).

n43. Id. at 1341.

n44. Native Culture notes the disparity, but describes it as "symptomatic of
broader social realities, not a failure of intellectual property law as such."
Brown, supra note 2, at 236. But a great failing of intellectual property law is
that it tends to protect the knowledge that developed countries produce while
leaving unprotected the knowledge produced by developing countries and
indigenous people. See generally Chander & Sunder, supra note 42.

n45. Brown, supra note 2, at 209.

n46. Id. at 8.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n47. Id. (citing Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century 18
(2000)).

n48. Id. at 209.

n49. See Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6, P 4.

n50. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, 231
(1998); cf. Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in Pragmatism
in Law and Society 247 (Michael Brant & William Weaver eds., 1991).

n51. See, e.g., Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6,
PP 18-20 (1997).

n52. See, e.g., Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal
Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian
Nations, 12 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 191 (2001); Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture,
and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America,
34 Ind. L. Rev. 1291 (2001).

n53. Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, supra note 6, Preface.

n54. As one commentator put it, referring to traditional knowledge (TK):

It seems highly unlikely that a new framework to protect TK will be inserted
into TRIPS anytime soon. And since the United States is determined to prevent
a WIPO convention on TK that could then be incorporated in TRIPS, this is
unlikely to happen even in the more distant future. At best, minimalist
measures to safeguard TK from misappropriation could conceivably be agreed
upon. A greater danger is that trade negotiators will sacrifice the interests of
traditional knowledge holders once concessions in other areas of intellectual
property or other trade-related issues are secured in return.
Graham Dutfield, Trips-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 Case W.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

Res. J. Int'l L. 233, 273 (2001).

n55. Id.

n56. Id.

n57. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 29.

n58. The Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-453, 118 Stat. 3596.

n59. 15 U.S.C. 1127 (2000).

n60. See Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org/.

n61. 25 U.S.C. 305 (2000).

n62. Daniel J. Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred
Intangible Traditional Knowledge, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 467, 494-95
(2003) (suggesting that "sacred traditional knowledge" could be protected
"based on collective or "communal' authorship, which already exists in
trademark law and related fields").

n63. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of
the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369 (2002); Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from
Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works and Entrepreneurship, 75
Or. L. Rev. 257 (1996).

n64. Riley, supra note 19, at 216 (proposing an Indian Copyright Act, which
"(1) is flexible enough to include the oral works of indigenous groups, which
means significantly altering existing copyright requirements; and (2) mandates
that disputes over the construction of the term "collective indigenous work' be
resolved in tribal court, subject to interpretation by tribal law and custom");

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

see also Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous
Peoples: Adapting Copyright Law to the Needs of a Global Community, 7 Yale
Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 51-78 (2004) (proposing "the incorporation of collective
and communal notions of authorship, the expansion of the originality
requirement to reflect these forms of authorship, and the application of limits
on the duration of copyright protection in a broader community context").

n65. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Property Rights Approach to Sacred
Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Non-Owners, 52 UCLA L. Rev.
1061 (2005); Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous
System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 69 (2005).

n66. See, e.g., Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty Through
Agreement, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 523, 537 (2003) (discussing factors a tribe
might consider in adopting commercial laws and adapting them to the tribe's
own norms).

n67. Robert Merges, Peter Menell, & Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property in the
New Technological Age 483 (3d ed. 2003).

n68. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C.
L. Rev. 1, 11 (1997); Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists:
Contract Theory and Analysis, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 827, 829-30 (1992).

n69. 17 U.S.C. 106 (2000) (providing that copyright owner has exclusive
right to create derivative works).

n70. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (1976).

n71. 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (2000).

n72. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).

n73. 17 U.S.C. 106(1), (3) (2000) (granting copyright owner the exclusive
rights to make and to distribute copies of the work).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n74. 35 U.S.C. 203 (2000).

n75. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J.
367, 373-74 (1999).

n76. The treatment of software, in particular, shows the adaptability of
copyright. Software is far removed from the original copyright subject matter.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights in "writings" to
their "authors." U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 8. Early copyright statutes applied to
such things as maps, books, and charts. As software became commercially
important, there was considerable debate whether a computer program was
really a "writing" created by an "author." Likewise, software is largely
functional, and copyright has always been deemed to protect only expressive
elements, not functional ones. But both legislation and case law have readily
adapted copyright to apply to software.

n77. Brown, supra note 2, at 240-41.

n78. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed
Wars, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 247, 331 (2003). As Native Culture notes,
sometimes outsiders are not aware of such "limited commons." Brown, supra
note 2, at 239. But supporting these commons with intellectual property rights
would translate them into widely recognized forms.

n79. See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81
B.U. L. Rev. 793, 796 (2001) (asserting "that intellectual property law, through
modification of its authorial and temporal limitations and creation of
community-specific protections such as an "authenticity mark,' has the
potential to strike an equitable balance between source community rights and
the public interest in cultural products"); Riley, supra note 19, at 216-17
(proposing a copyright statute that is "specifically geared towards Indian
peoples - one which encompasses inter-generational, oral traditions, as well as
indigenous perspectives").

n80. Brown, supra note 2, at 144-72.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n81. Id. at 232.

n82. See Kate Morris, Strategies and Procedures for the Repatriation of
Materials from the Private Sector, in American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation
Foundation, Mending the Circle: A Native American Repatriation Guide,
available at http://www.repatriation/ foundation.org/strat.html.

n83. Carpenter, supra note 65, at 1142-43.

n84. Id. at 1146. In describing a rights-based approach to sacred sites,
Professor Carpenter "calls for the recognition of Indian rights in the context of
Indian relationships with the government, other citizens, and the land itself
and in the context of widely shared values like religious freedom and cultural
diversity." Thus, contemplating a place for "thoughtful conversation" as urged
by Professor Brown.

n85. Suzan Shown Harjo, Introduction to American Ritual Object Repatriation
Foundation, Mending the Circle: A Native American Repatriation Guide 3
(1996); cf. NMAI Not Just a Decoration, Indian Country Today, Sept. 22, 2004,
at A1 (discussing the important role that Harjo and others played in
negotiating repatriation issues at the federal level).

n86. Indian Arts and Crafts Act, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4666
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 18, 20, 25, and 42).

n87. Brown, supra note 2, at 215; Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous
People, supra note 6, P 64.

n88. Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settement Area and Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, http://www.tunngavik.com/siteeng/nlca/nlca.htm.

n89. The 1982 Constitution Act recognized and affirmed "the existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada." Rights of the
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, Canada Act, 1982,
ch. 11, sched. B 35(1) (U.K.).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

n90. Gov't of Nunavut, Premier Paul Okalik, Speaking Notes: Nunavut - North
America's Newest Democracy (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/English/premier/press/ nand.shtml (last visited
Sept. 22, 2005). See generally Graham, Resolving Indigenous Claims, supra
note 37, at 412-20.

n91. Peter K. Yu, Introduction, Symposium: Traditional Knowledge,
Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L.
239, 245 (2003).

n92. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 Cardozo
J. Int'l & Comp. L. 547, 553 (2003) (discussing how international initiatives
toward protection of traditional knowledge and folklore have contributed to the
making of local agreements "among research institutions, companies,
communities and non-governmental organizations").

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956643

